



Using imprecise continuous time Markov chains for assessing the reliability of power networks with common cause failure and non-immediate repair

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joint work with

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Motivating Example

- random components, say power generators with capacity X_i




- deterministic known risk threshold, say power demand x



Motivating Example

$$\text{risk} = \Pr\left(\sum_{i=1}^n X_i \leq x\right)$$



in common cases:

- threshold well x known (not always!)
- distribution of $\sum_{i=1}^n X_i$ is **very sensitive to modelling assumptions**


Motivating Example

Modelling Assumptions On $\sum_{i=1}^n X_i$?

- **marginal** distributions of each X_i = easy to get right
- **interactions** between the different X_i = easy to get wrong

positive correlation

Total generation




= typical reality
why?

common cause
events

independent

Total generation




= typical assumption
why?

computational
convenience

negative correlation


Total generation



= unusual

The Instant Repair Model

Continuous Time Markov Chain



model parameters:

- q_2 : common-cause failure rate
- q_1^A & q_1^B : 'single-cause' failure rate per component

Markov assumption:

- failure rates unaffected by history

Parameterisation: Alpha-Factor Model

'directly observable' parameters:

$$q_2 = \frac{\alpha_2}{\alpha_1 + 2\alpha_2} (q_t^A + q_t^B) \quad (1)$$

$$q_1^A = q_t^A - q_2 \quad (2)$$

$$q_1^B = q_t^B - q_2 \quad (3)$$

- α_2 = fraction of faults due to common cause $\alpha_1 = 1 - \alpha_2$
- q_t^A & q_t^B = failure rates of components seen separately

The Data

Expert Knowledge

- α_2 : directly from **nationwide statistics**
- q_t^A & q_t^B : from nationwide statistics about constituents e.g. from
 - ▶ average failure rate per km of overhead line
 - ▶ average failure rate per km of underground cable
 - ▶ any other components . . .

regional dependencies?

how applicable is nationwide data to a specific network?


Direct Failure Data about the Actual Network Under Study

typically, very sparse, but more informative

we propose **imprecise probability** to cope with lack of relevant data
and uncertainty about applicability of expert opinion

The Analysis: Why Imprecise Probability?

- nationwide statistics inform the mean of the prior
- we consider a set of variances for the prior
- this is an elegant way to handle prior-data conflict [13]



**variance of prior = judgement about how fast you are willing
to learn from data**

Incorporating Repair: Why?


What do network operators care about?

- How frequently do outages occur?

Approximately answered by previous analysis even though instant repair assumption is not realistic.

- How long do outages last for?

Need explicit repair model! How? Billinton & Allan [1]:



Issues

- Markov assumption violated in reality.
- Little data to estimate parameters.


We can use imprecision to address both issues.

Incorporating Repair: Issues With The Standard Model

Model assumptions blatantly violated in even the simplest systems!

- **violation of stationarity**

Failure rates are usually not constant in time: **bathtub curve**.





- **epistemic uncertainty**

There can be substantial uncertainty about the rates themselves, particularly for common cause events.

Incorporating Repair: Issues With The Standard Model

- **violation of Markov condition**

Repair rates depend on system history, and repair times are not exponentially distributed as predicted by the model.



- **missing covariates**

Repair rates depend on operation of the entire power system.
For instance: severe weather, many simultaneous failures, but number of repair crews is limited.

... so, why use this model?

Incorporating Repair: Why Use The Standard Model?

Computation!

$$E(f(X_t) \mid X_0 = i) = [e^{tQ} f]_i \quad (4)$$

- e^{tQ} = matrix exponential
- many efficient methods for calculating it
(although numerical stability sometimes an issue)

Other examples:

$$\pi Q = 0 \quad \text{long term distribution } \pi \quad (5)$$

$$\tau \pi_i \quad \text{expected time spent in state } i \quad (6)$$

$$- \tau \pi_i Q_{ij} \quad \text{expected number of transitions to state } i \quad (7)$$

Imprecise Continuous Time Markov Chains

Concerns

- Can we **efficiently** compute inferential bounds?

Yes, subject to a technical condition
(but can always do so conservatively).

- Can this very large class of statistical processes still produce **useful** bounds on inferences?

Apparently, yes!

Theorem (Škulj, 2012)

Under fairly relaxed technical conditions:

$$\underline{\mathbb{E}}(f(X_t) \mid X_0 = i) = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \left[\left(I + (t/n) \underline{Q} \right)^n f \right]_i \quad (8)$$

where $[\underline{Q}f]_i := \min_{Q \in \underline{Q}} [Qf]_i$

Conclusion

- Sparse data and prior-data conflict? Bayes + sensitivity analysis.
- Relaxing Markov assumption and stationarity via bounding?
It is **easy** and inferences still **sufficiently precise**.
- Novel mathematics like imprecise Markov chains enable
a **much wider class of statistical processes**
reducing model discrepancies and improving risk analysis.
- Imprecision not only useful for epistemic uncertainty,
also useful to study very complex models in an efficient way.

Future work:

- How to get model parameter bounds from data in general?
- Improved algorithms for “imprecise matrix exponential”.
- Additional covariates: failure rates depend on system context.
- Decision making for power network design:
tradeoff between cost of redundancy and common-cause risks.
- Potential for applications to other practical problems.

Thank you for listening & visit the poster!

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